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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Adams Outdoor Advertising, L.P., wants to install a 
billboard near an interchange on U.S. Route 22 in Hanover 
Township, Pennsylvania.  Adams sought a permit from the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), but 
it denied the permit under a provision of Pennsylvania law that 
prohibits “off premise” billboards within 500 feet of a highway 
interchange.  Adams contends that provision—called the 
“Interchange Prohibition”—violates the First Amendment 
because it is too vague or, alternatively, because it does not 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.  Adams also claims that 
PennDOT’s permitting requirement for highway billboards 
separately violates the First Amendment because there is no 
time limit for its decisions on applications. 
The District Court ruled in Adams’ favor on the time-
limit claim and entered an injunction barring the enforcement 
of the permit requirement until PennDOT establishes 
reasonable time limits on its permit decisions.  It dismissed, 
however, Adams’ vagueness challenge on the pleadings and 
entered summary judgment against Adams on its First 
Amendment scrutiny challenge.  
We affirm in part and reverse in part.  As to the former, 
we join the District Court in concluding that PennDOT’s 
permit requirement violates the First Amendment because it 
lacks a reasonable time limit for permit determinations, and 
thus sustain the injunction.  Further, we affirm the Court’s 
dismissal of Adams’ vagueness challenge because the 
Interchange Prohibition communicates clearly what it 
prohibits.  But we cannot sustain its entry of summary 
judgment in favor of PennDOT Secretary Richards on Adams’ 
challenge to the scrutiny required to assess the Interchange 
Prohibition.  Although we conclude the Prohibition is not 
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subject to strict scrutiny, the record is insufficient to establish 
the required reasoning for the prohibition.  We thus reverse on 
that claim and remand for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
 
A. Statutory Background 
The Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. 
§ 131, establishes a framework for federal–state agreements 
governing the size, lighting, and spacing of outdoor advertising 
signs (colloquially, “billboards”) near highways.  States that do 
not enter into and comply with their federal–state agreements 
under the Beautification Act lose certain funds for highway 
programs.  See 23 U.S.C. § 131(b).  
Pennsylvania meets its obligations under the 
Beautification Act through the Pennsylvania Outdoor 
Advertising Control Act of 1971, 36 Pa. Stat. §§ 2718.101–
.115.  PennDOT administers the Act through its Secretary, 
defendant-appellee Leslie Richards.  36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.106.  
Two aspects of the Act are relevant in this appeal.  First, 
its Interchange Prohibition bars the installation of any billboard 
within 500 feet of an “interchange” or “safety rest area” unless 
the billboard is an “official” or “on premise” sign as defined in 
23 U.S.C. § 131(c).  See 36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.105(c)(2)(i), (iv).  
Second, the Act sets up a permitting regime requiring persons 
to obtain permits from either PennDOT or a PennDOT-
authorized entity to install billboards regulated by the former.  
See 36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.107.  The Act does not establish a time 
limit to decide permit applications.   
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B. Facts and Procedural History 
Adams is a company that acquires or leases private land 
to install and maintain outdoor advertising signs as a medium 
of communication by the public.  It receives the customer’s 
desired message, secures permits, and installs the message on 
a sign.  All the signs Adams installs are “off premise” signs—
that is, they communicate a message concerning neither the 
specific property where the sign is displayed nor the business 
or activities that occur there.  An example of an “off premise” 
sign would be one advertising a law firm, a political campaign, 
or any other business or organization that does not operate on 
the location where the sign is installed.  
In March 2016 Adams applied to PennDOT for a permit 
to install a billboard alongside U.S. Route 22 in Hanover 
Township.  The application remained pending for more than a 
year.  During that time Adams filed this lawsuit, which 
prompted PennDOT to act.  It denied the application because 
the billboard’s proposed location was less than 500 feet from a 
highway interchange in violation of the Interchange 
Prohibition.   
Adams named both Secretary Richards and PennDOT 
as defendants, but PennDOT was dismissed early in the 
proceedings.  Adams does not challenge that dismissal on 
appeal.  The Complaint alleges six claims under the First 
Amendment, three of which are relevant here:  the Interchange 
Prohibition violates the First Amendment because (1) it is too 
vague, (2) it is a content-based regulation that on its face cannot 
survive the scrutiny called for by the Amendment, and (3) its 
permitting requirement does not impose a time limit on 
PennDOT to rule on applications.  
The District Court dismissed the vagueness challenge 
on the pleadings.  Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. Pa. 
6 
 
Dep’t of Transp., 307 F. Supp. 3d 380, 390–93 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  
It also denied the motion to reconsider that dismissal.  Adams 
Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 526, 534–35 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  The other two claims 
went through discovery.  The Court then granted summary 
judgment for Secretary Richards on the First Amendment 
scrutiny challenge to the Interchange Prohibition.  Id. at 535–
39.  But it granted summary judgment for Adams on the permit 
challenge and issued an injunction prohibiting PennDOT from 
enforcing the Act’s permitting requirement until it issues rules 
establishing time constraints for its decisions on applications.  
Id. at 541–45. 
On appeal, Adams challenges the District Court’s 
resolution on all three of these claims.  Although Adams won 
summary judgment on the last issue, it contends the proper 
relief is an injunction compelling the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly to amend the Act.  Secretary Richards contends the 
District Court should not have entered an injunction at all, 
though she did not appeal the District Court’s decision granting 
it and acknowledged at oral argument that she is not 
challenging it.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
review de novo its orders granting summary judgment and 
granting Secretary Richards’ motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 
2014); Vorchheimer v. Phila. Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 
(3d Cir. 2018).  We review the District Court’s “fashioning of 
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a remedy according to an abuse of discretion standard.”  
Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1997).  
III. Discussion 
 
A. Vagueness Challenge 
Our Supreme Court has identified two grounds on 
which to hold a statute impermissibly vague.  “First, if it fails 
to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.”  Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).  “Second, if it authorizes 
or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  
Id.   
We join the District Court in concluding that Adams 
failed to allege either form of vagueness.  The Interchange 
Prohibition clearly conveys what it prohibits.  It bans the 
installation of billboards within 500 feet of either side of an 
interchange on a divided highway, other than “official” or “on 
premise” billboards, as defined by federal law.  Official signs 
are “[d]irectional or other official signs or notices erected and 
maintained by public officers or agencies . . . for the purpose 
of carrying out an official duty or responsibility.”  23 C.F.R. 
§ 750.105(a) (incorporated into the Interchange Prohibition by 
reference, see 36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.105(c)(2)(iv), 23 U.S.C. 
§ 131(c)).  On-premise signs are those that “advertise the sale 
or lease of, or activities being conducted upon, the real property 
where the signs are located.”  23 C.F.R. § 750.105(a) 
(incorporated into the Interchange Prohibition by reference, 
see 36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.105(c)(2)(iv), 23 U.S.C. § 131(c)).  The 
Prohibition is clear enough that a person of ordinary 
intelligence would “understand what conduct it prohibits.”  
Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.  The provision also does not give 
PennDOT authorization to enforce arbitrarily or in a 
discriminatory way.  When construing the provision, its 
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discretion is cabined by explicit distance measurements, and 
Adams does not allege any facts suggesting PennDOT applies 
those metrics in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.   
Adams instead complains that PennDOT’s 
interpretation of its 500-foot radius has changed a few times 
since the provision’s enactment in 1971.  At times between 
1971 and 1997, PennDOT construed the provision’s 500-foot 
radius to extend from highway interchanges on only one side 
of a divided highway.  That position altered in 1997, when 
PennDOT issued a guidance letter (the “1997 Strike-Off 
Letter”) establishing its position—held continuously since 
then—that the Interchange Prohibition applies to both sides of 
a divided highway. 
Adams asserts the changes in PennDOT’s interpretation 
prove the Interchange Prohibition is unconstitutionally vague.  
We disagree.  Although the provision is broad enough to permit 
more than one agency interpretation, that does not mean it is 
unconstitutionally vague.  That is so because in evaluating a 
vagueness challenge to a state law, “a federal court must, of 
course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or 
enforcement agency has proffered.”  Vill. of Hoffman Estates 
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 
(1982).  In other words, we can consider the 1997 Strike-Off 
Letter when evaluating the vagueness challenge of Adams, and 
that letter cures the supposed vagueness it asserts. 
Accordingly, we affirm dismissal on the pleadings of 
Adams’ vagueness claim.  
B. Scrutiny Challenge to Interchange 
Prohibition 
Adams also contends the Interchange Prohibition is a 
content-based restraint of speech that is subject to, and does not 
9 
 
satisfy, strict scrutiny—that is, the requirement that a law must 
further a compelling government interest by the least 
restrictive means.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney 
General, 825 F.3d 149, 164 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Before reaching the merits of this claim, we address a 
question raised by the District Court:  whether Adams has 
standing to challenge the Interchange Prohibition’s exemption 
of official and on-premise signs even though it does not wish 
to install either of those sign types.  Standing requires (1) an 
“injury in fact” that is (2) “fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant” and (3) capable of a court remedy.  Id. 
at 165 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We conclude Adams has standing.  Its liberty to speak 
is restrained by PennDOT’s enforcement of the Interchange 
Prohibition, and an order invalidating that provision would 
restore that liberty.  It does not matter, for purposes of our 
standing analysis, that Adams challenges the Prohibition by 
pointing to exemptions for which it does not qualify.  
Challengers of outdoor advertising restraints often point to 
exemptions enjoyed by others when seeking to challenge a 
restraint as contrary to the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015); Riel v. City of 
Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 748–54 (3d Cir. 2007).  That approach 
is proper here.  
As to the merits, we begin by determining what level of 
First Amendment scrutiny to apply to the Prohibition.  Adams 
contends it is subject to strict scrutiny because it exempts 
“official” and “on premise” signs.  
We deal first with the exemption for official signs.  As 
noted, they are “[d]irectional or other official signs or notices 
erected and maintained by public officers or agencies . . . for 
the purpose of carrying out an official duty or responsibility.”  
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23 C.F.R. § 750.105(a).  These are forms of government 
speech, and an exemption for them does not trigger strict 
scrutiny.  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
467–68 (2009); accord Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. at 2233 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Adams does not meaningfully dispute 
this point. 
The exemption for on-premise signs is a closer call.  As 
noted, they “advertise the sale or lease of, or activities being 
conducted upon, the real property where the signs are located.”  
23 C.F.R. § 750.105(a).  An example is a sign advertising a 
restaurant that is installed on the property where the restaurant 
is located.  The leading decision by our Court in this area is 
Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994).  
There we set out a framework for reviewing the 
constitutionality of outdoor advertising regulations that 
provide exemptions for signs that convey messages with a 
“significant relationship” to the property where they are 
located.  Id. at 1065–66.  We drew a distinction between two 
kinds of on-premise signs:  (1) those that advertise the 
“activities conducted on the premises,” and (2) those that 
advertise “the sale or lease of the real property on which they 
are located.”  Id. at 1066–67 & n.42.1  For both, Secretary 
                                              
1 Adams presses us to deviate from Rappa and apply strict 
scrutiny under Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. at 2230–31.  We 
decline.  That case did not address an exemption for on-
premise signs, and the concurring opinions by Justices Alito 
and Kagan, which received a total of six votes, both indicated 
that on-premise sign regulations are content neutral and 
expressed that strict scrutiny would not apply to outdoor 
advertising regulations merely because they provide an 
exemption for on-premise signs.  See id. at 2233 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[r]ules distinguishing between on-
premises and off-premises signs” would not trigger strict 
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Richards bears the burden to prove the exemptions survive the 
applicable First Amendment scrutiny.  
1. Exemption for on-premise “for 
sale or lease” signs 
An exemption for on-premise “for sale or lease” signs 
is subject to a special “context-specific” scrutiny we crafted in 
Rappa—the exemption must be “substantially related to 
advancing an important state interest that is at least as 
important as the interests advanced by the [overall prohibition], 
. . . no broader than necessary to advance the special goal, 
and . . . narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible on 
the overall goal.”  18 F.3d at 1065.  
Secretary Richards has not carried her burden to show 
the Interchange Prohibition’s exemption for on-premise “for 
sale or lease” signs meets this context-specific test.  She does 
not present evidence of the specific government interests at 
stake, nor does she show, as she must, that the government’s 
interest in providing an exemption for on-premise “for sale or 
lease” signs is “at least as important as” that served by the 
Prohibition itself.  Id. at 1065–67.  She also does not present 
evidence concerning the narrow tailoring of that exemption.  In 
                                              
scrutiny); id. at 2236–37 (Kagan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (finding it “challenging to understand why” strict 
scrutiny would apply to sign regulations that do not suggest 
government censorship or viewpoint discrimination).  
In addition, because of its splintered reasoning, Town of 
Gilbert did not establish a legal standard by which to evaluate 
laws that distinguish between on-premise and off-premise 
signs.  We thus fall back to our precedent in Rappa for 
reviewing sign regulations exempting on-premise signs.  See 
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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short, she has not carried her burden to justify the Prohibition’s 
exemption for on-premise “for sale or lease” signs. 
2. Exemption for on-premise signs 
concerning activities on the 
property 
Under Rappa, an exemption for on-premise signs 
concerning activities on the property is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, see 18 F.3d at 1067 & n.42—that is, it must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”  Id. at 1075 (quoting Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting 
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984))). 
Secretary Richards has not carried her burden to justify 
the Prohibition’s exemption for signs concerning activities on 
the property.  Indeed, the record does not satisfy any of the 
prongs of intermediate scrutiny:  it does not contain evidence 
of the specific government interests furthered, nor evidence of 
narrow tailoring, nor evidence that “ample alternative channels 
for communication” are left open.   
In sum, the lack of record evidence prevents us from 
affirming the District Court’s entry of summary judgment 
against Adams on its challenge to the Interchange Prohibition 
based on First Amendment scrutiny.  Accordingly, we reverse 
that portion of the District Court’s ruling and remand for the 
parties to litigate further Secretary Richards’ justification for 
the restraint and its exemptions. 
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C. The Injunction 
Finally, we review the District Court’s entry of an 
injunction prohibiting Secretary Richards from enforcing the 
Act’s permit requirement until PennDOT establishes time 
limits on its permit decisions. 
The Act’s permit regime is a prior restraint on speech.  
Riel, 485 F.3d at 756.  As such, it “presents peculiar dangers to 
constitutionally protected speech.”  Freedman v. Maryland, 
380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (discussing the dangers of prior 
restraint in the context of motion-picture censorship).  To 
address those dangers, the First Amendment requires “strict 
administrative time limits” on permit decisions and “the 
possibility of prompt judicial review” of permit denials.  City 
of Littleton v. ZJ Gifts D-4, LLC, 541 U.S. 774, 779 (2004) 
(construing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 220–
21, 228, 239 (1990)).2  These requirements diminish the risk of 
arbitrarily or “indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.”  
Riel, 485 F.3d at 756 (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227). 
There is no bright-line rule as to what a “strict 
administrative time limit” is in this context, yet we easily 
conclude the Act does not satisfy it in this case.  For the Act 
contains no time limit at all, and neither do the regulations 
implementing it.  In practice this has caused permit 
applications to remain pending for prolonged periods of time—
sometimes more than a year, as occurred to Adams’ application 
here.  We thus agree with our District Court colleague’s 
decision to enjoin Secretary Richards from enforcing the Act’s 
                                              
2 Additional procedural safeguards apply to permitting regimes 
that involve content-based determinations.  See Thomas v. 
Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322–23 (2002). 
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permit requirement until there is set a time limit that satisfies 
the First Amendment.3  
* * * * * 
The Interchange Prohibition conveys clearly what it 
prohibits, so we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Adams’ vagueness challenge.  We also affirm the entry of an 
injunction barring enforcement of the permitting requirements 
under 36 Pa. Stat. § 2718.107 until PennDOT establishes 
reasonable time limits for its permit decisions, as required by 
the First Amendment.  But we reverse and remand on Adams’ 
challenge to the Interchange Prohibition based on First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Although that provision is not subject to 
strict scrutiny—but rather “context-specific” scrutiny under 
Rappa for on-premise “for sale or lease” signs and intermediate 
scrutiny for on-premise signs as to activities on the property—
Secretary Richards bears the burden to justify the restraint it 
imposes and the exemptions it provides.  She has not done so 
on the current record.  On remand she will have that chance.  
                                              
3 On appeal Adams argued that the District Court did not go far 
enough in the injunctive remedy it granted, as it should have 
ordered the Pennsylvania General Assembly to amend the 
statute to add a time limit.  Given that neither we nor the 
District Court has the power to grant that relief, see Murphy v. 
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481–82 (2018), we reject Adams’ 
request and sustain the remedy crafted by the District Court.  
In addition, the Court did not abuse its discretion just because 
it did not award the relief that Adams thinks “should” have 
been granted.  Adams does not offer any reason why the 
injunction was insufficient to remedy § 2718.107’s 
unconstitutionality, and we see none. 
